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CASE COMMENT
Tort Law-INDEMNITY-ORIGINAL TORTFEASOR UNABLE TO RECOVER
FOR AGGRAVATION OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURY By NEGLIGENT ACTION OF SEC-
OND TORTFEASOR-StUart V. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
In Stuart v. Hertz Corp., I an automobile owned by Hertz Corpora-
tion and driven by a minor, Stafford Holbrook, collided with a
motor vehicle driven by Mrs. Ruth Johnson McCutcheon. Mrs.
McCutcheon suffered severe orthopedic injuries in the accident and
underwent surgery performed by Dr. Frank M. Stuart. Her carotid
artery was accidentally severed during the surgery, causing neurol-
ogical damage and disability.! Mrs. McCutcheon and her husband,
Louis N. McCutcheon, filed suit against Hertz Corporation as owner
of the automobile and against George Holbrook individually and as
father, next friend, and guardian ad litem of Stafford Holbrook,
claiming damages for injuries arising out of the accident.3
Mrs. McCutcheon's complaint alleged that as a direct result of
Stafford Holbrook's negligent operation of the Hertz vehicle, she
was injured about her body extremities and suffered an aggravation
of a known preexisting injury. After filing their answer, the defen-
dants filed a third-party complaint against Dr. Stuart (and his in-
surer) contending that all or part of Mrs. McCutcheon's injuries
were the result of Dr. Stuart's negligent and unskilled medical treat-
ment.4 The trial court denied Stuart's motion to dismiss the third-
party complaint.5 The Fourth District Court of Appeal unanimously
affirmed the trial court's action! The district court of appeal rea-
soned that under the existing facts, an initial tortfeasor causing the
1. 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
2. Id. at 704.
3. Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 302 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974), quashed &
remanded, 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
4. Id. at 188-89.
The third party complaint filed by Hertz sought indemnification from Dr. Stuart
for his alleged acts of negligence as follows:
"9. That the Third Party Plaintiffs contend that whatever responsibility
for damages, if any, may be ultimately determined by a jury would be lim-
ited to an orthopedic disability and that the Third Party Defendants are
liable for any damages for neurological damages caused by Dr. Stuart's
negligence; that the Third Party Plaintiffs are only secondarily liable for the
neurological damages and are but passive tort feasors and as such are enti-
tled to indemnification from the active tort feasor, DR. FRANK STUART."
Id. at 189.
5. Id. at 188.
6. Id. at 194.
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plaintiffs injury had the right to seek indemnification against a
physician for aggravating an injury in the course of treatment. 7
The Supreme Court of Florida granted conflict certiorari.8 The
court quashed the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal
and remanded the case with instructions to grant the doctor's mo-
tion to dismiss the third-party complaint.'
In a case of first impression in Florida, the central issue was
whether a tortfeasor in an automobile accident could bring a third-
party action for indemnity against a physician for damages directly
attributable to malpractice which aggravated the plaintiffs inju-
ries.'0 The court concluded that such an action could not be
brought."1 To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would alter tradi-
tional indemnity law in Florida. It would constitute adoption of a
doctrine of partial equitable indemnification between active tortfea-
sors. 12
The Stuart court feared that third-party indemnity actions of this
character would expand the concept of indemnity to the point of
making it indistinguishable from contribution. 3 Moreover, the
court reasoned that to allow an active tortfeasor to seek indemnifi-
cation from a subsequent physician tortfeasor would obfuscate the
issue of liability by encouraging original tortfeasors to complicate
and prolong litigation through filing third-party malpractice ac-
tions. The court believed that embracing such a doctrine would
force seriously injured plaintiffs to litigate complex malpractice
suits concurrently in order to proceed with personal injury corn-
7. Id. The court stated: "[Tihere is an equitable right to indemnity under certain factual
considerations and particularly under the facts present in the case sub judice; a tort feasor
initially causing an injury has the right to seek indemnification against the physician for
aggravating injury [sic] in the course of treatment."
8. The court granted conflict certiorari because of a decisional conflict with the holding
of the Third District Court of Appeal in Mathis v. Virgin, 167 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1964). Article V, § 3(b) of the Florida Constitution provides:
The supreme court:
(3) May review by certiorari any decision of a district court of appeal that affects
a class of constitutional or state officers, that passes upon a question certified by a
district court of appeal to be of great public interest, or that is in direct conflict
with a decision of any district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same
question of law, and any interlocutory order passing upon a matter which upon final
judgment would be directly appealable to the supreme court; and may issue writs
of certiorari to commissions established by general law having statewide jurisdic-
tion.
9. 351 So. 2d 703.
10. Id. at 704.
11. Id. at 705.




plaints. The court also feared an undermining of the patient-
physician relationship. 5
The Stuart court followed the Arizona case of Transcon Lines v.
Barnes. 6 In that case, a wrongful death action was brought against
the owner and driver of a truck which had collided with an automo-
bile in which the decedent was a passenger. Although the decedent
suffered only back and neck injuries as a result of the accident, she
later died of bronchopneumonia-forty-nine days after being placed
in the care of a physician.17 The trucking company filed a cross-
complaint for indemnity against the doctor and other medical at-
tendants, stipulating to its negligence in causing the auto accident
but expressly denying any liability for wrongful death.
Following a verdict against the trucking company and the physi-
cian, the trial court dismissed the cross-claim for indemnity. The
Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed the trial court's decision.18 The
court concluded that the liability of Transcon Lines stemmed from
its performance of a negligent act which resulted in injuries to the
decedent. These injuries resulted in death when combined with the
negligent medical treatment. This was found to be a foreseeable risk
flowing from Transcon's original negligence."
The Transcon court reasoned that since indemnity is an all-or-
nothing proposition in terms of damages, it should be an all-or-
nothing proposition in terms of fault.20 The court concluded that
indemnity between tortfeasors should be allowed only when the
whole of the fault is in the one against whom indemnity is sought.
Thus, since Transcon Lines was not without fault, it was not enti-
tled to indemnity.'
Both Chief Justice Overton and Justice Boyd dissented when this
same reasoning was employed by the majority in Stuart.2 2 Justice
Boyd concurred with Justice Adkins' opinion that an original tort-
feasor should not be permitted to join treating physicians in suits
for damages without the permission of the injured plaintiff. He dis-
15. Id.
16. 498 P.2d 502 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).
17. Id. at 503.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 508.
20. Id. at 509.
21. Id. at 504. The Transcon court also relied substantially on RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
TORTS § 457 (1965), which provides:
If the negligent actor is liable for another's bodily injury, he is also subject to
liability for any additional bodily harm resulting from normal efforts of third per-
sons in rendering aid which the other's injury reasonably requires, irrespective of
whether such acts are done in a proper or a negligent manner.
22. 351 So. 2d at 707-08.
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sented, however, from the majority view that an active tortfeasor
should not be allowed to shift an equitable portion of an adverse
judgment to others who caused or increased the injuries or dam-
ages. 3
Chief Justice Overton also wrote a strong dissent, pointing out
that indemnity is a proper remedy when others have been compelled
to pay damages which should have been paid by the wrongdoer. He
contended that one tortfeasor should not be held responsible for all
the plaintiff's injuries without the right of indemnification for the
identifiable consequences of another's wrong. 24 Overton relied sub-
stantially on the reasoning of the California First District Court of
Appeal in Herrero v. Atkinson21 and that of the Illinois Supreme
Court in Gertz v. Campbell 2 to conclude that an indemnity action
by the original tortfeasor against the physician was an appropriate
remedy when the negligent tortfeasor was liable for damages di-
rectly attributable to the physician's malpractice.
In Herrero, plaintiff Alice Lorenzo was severely injured in an au-
tomobile accident due to defendant Herrero's negligence. About
eighteen months later, she entered the hospital for surgery made
necessary by the accident. Lorenzo died during the operation be-
cause of the negligence of hospital personnel in administering a
blood transfusion. The plaintiff's estate filed a wrongful death ac-
tion against Herrero, who then filed a cross-complaint for declara-
tory relief and indemnity against the doctors and the hospital. 2
On appeal, the California First District Court of Appeal reversed
the trial court's dismissal of the cross-complaint. The court con-
cluded that Herrero should have been allowed the indemnity he
sought. The court ruled that the hospital and doctors should bear
that portion of the damages caused by their own negligent conduct.2
The court noted that the original negligence of Herrero could be
regarded as the proximate cause of the damages flowing from the
subsequent malpractice of the cross-defendants and that the plain-
23. Id. at 707. Justice Boyd, in his dissent, concluded that although Hertz Corporation
would not be allowed to join Dr. Stuart as a third-party defendant, it should be permitted to
allege and prove any malpractice and have the judgment amount reduced to the extent that
the malpractice contributed to the total amount of damages. Justice Boyd reasoned further
that it was fundamentally unfair and unjust to require Hertz or the Holbrooks to pay for the
doctor's negligence. He felt that although his opinion might conflict with existing legal con-
cepts regarding indemnity, it followed the ancient common law principle that each person
must be accountable for his own misconduct.
24. Id. at 708.
25. 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
26. 302 N.E.2d 40 (Ill. 1973).
27. 38 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
28. Id. at 494.
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tiff could recover jointly and severally against all parties found
liable. 9 The court felt, however, that there was no reason why the
ultimate burden of damages should not be distributed among the
various defendants under equitable principles.3 1
In the Illinois case, Gertz, the plaintiff, a minor, was struck by a
negligent motorist while standing on the shoulder of a road. The
motorist later filed a third-party complaint against the treating
physician, contending that the physician's negligence and malprac-
tice had resulted in amputation of the plaintiff's right leg. Although
the trial court dismissed the third-party action, an appellate court
reversed, and the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the appellate
court's holding that the motorist had a right to bring the action for
indemnity for damages attributable to malpractice.'
The Gertz court maintained that what the negligent motorist
sought was "not repugnant" to the notion of indemnity.32 The court
held that the defendant was not seeking to pass on any conse-
quences of his own fault but was merely asserting that he should not
be required to bear the burden of consequences flowing solely from
the physician's malpractice. The court reasoned that if the motorist
were precluded from seeking indemnity from the doctor, the result
would be an indefensible enrichment of the doctor at the expense
of the motorist.3 Moreover, since the defendant had no control over
the selection of the doctor or his subsequent conduct, the court felt
that there was nothing he could have done to prevent the indepen-
dent negligence of the physician. Thus, the motorist had a right to
be indemnified for those damages proximately caused by the mal-
practice.3
Florida has traditionally followed the common law rule that a
tortfeasor is responsible for all injuries which flow naturally from the
original tortious act.35 That rule, as stated by the Florida Supreme
Court in J. Ray Arnold Lumber Corp v. Richardson,3 provides that
an original tortfeasor is liable for all injuries to the plaintiff, includ-
ing even those aggravated or increased through the negligence of a
treating physician 7.3 This rule is followed by a majority of jurisdic-
29. Id. at 493.
30. Id. For further discussion of Herrero, see Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 629 (1970).
31. 302 N.E.2d at 45.
32. Id. at 44.
33. Id. at 45.
34. Id. See also Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L.
REv. 130, 146-47 (1932).
35. 302 So. 2d at 190.
36. 141 So. 133 (Fla. 1932).
37. Id. at 135. The court also stated:
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tions18
It should be emphasized that adoption of a third-party indemnifi-
cation practice in Stuart would not have altered this traditional
concept of tort recovery. Instead, indemnification would simply pro-
vide one tortfeasor with the means to be compensated or indemni-
fied for those clearly identifiable consequences of another's wrong.
In his dissent in Stuart, Chief Justice Overton pointed out that
Hertz's third-party complaint against Dr. Stuart did not disturb the
existing Florida law that a tortfeasor remains responsible for all
injuries which flow from the original tortious act. In addition, the
chief justice said that he would have reaffirmed the holding of the
Florida Supreme Court in J. Ray Arnold Lumber Corp.39
As asserted by the California First District Court of Appeal in
Herrero and by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Stuart, a
third-party complaint such as Hertz's does not alter a plaintiff's
right to sue whom he chooses and to recover against any one or all
of the defendants he names who are ultimately found liable 0 The
plaintiff is not concerned with the claims of the named defendants
against one another or the claims of the defendant against third
parties. Regardless of any distribution of liability among the defen-
dants through indemnification, a plaintiff may satisfy his judgment
against one or all of the tortfeasors he sues who are found liable."
A reading of rule 1.180 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
which relates to third-party practice, and a review of the commen-
taries which have discussed that rule, indicate that the present
third-party procedure is available in situations involving reimburse-
ment or indemnification. Rule 1.180 provides in part:
The rule in such cases is as follows:
"Where one who has suffered personal injuries by reason of the negligence of
another exercises reasonable care in securing the services of a competent physician
or surgeon, and in following his advice and instructions, and his injuries are there-
after aggravated or increased by the negligence, mistake, or lack of skill of such
physician or surgeon, the law regards the negligence of the wrongdoer in causing
the original injury as the proximate cause of the damages flowing from the subse-
quent negligent or unskillful treatment thereof, and holds him liable therefore."
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Hill, 237 U.S. 208 . . . [1915].
Id.
38. See, e.g., Chicago City Ry. v. Saxby, 72 N.E. 755 (Ill. 1904). See also W. PaossER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Toirrs § 44, at 278 (4th ed. 1971). This rule has also been stated in
57 Am. JuR. (SECOND) Negligence § 149, at 507, as follows: "[A] wrongdoer is liable for the
ultimate result, although the mistake or even the negligence of the physician who treated the
injury may have increased the damage which would otherwise have followed from the original
wrong."
39. 351 So. 2d at 708.
40. 302 So. 2d at 187.
41. Id. at 189.
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(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At any time
after commencement of the action a defendant as a third party
plaintiff may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon
a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him
for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him.2
The editor of Florida Civil Practice Before Trial points out:
Third party practice is the procedure available to a defendant
(or counter-defendant or third party defendant) to join a person
who is not a party to the action in circumstances arising out of the
same set of facts when the added party is or may be liable to
compensate, reimburse or indemnify the defendant for the plain-
tiff's claim. 3
Consider these principles as they relate to the facts in Stuart. We
are presented with a defendant who has been charged with tortious
conduct giving rise to multiple and diverse personal injuries to the
plaintiff. Under Florida law, that defendant is held responsible for
any damages flowing from his original negligent act." This defen-
dant, however, by way of a third-party action, seeks indemnification
from another alleged wrongdoer who may be liable to the original
defendant for all or a portion of the plaintiff's claim. 5 This right to
indemnification depends on the principle that everyone is responsi-
ble for the consequences of his own wrong, and, if others have been
compelled to pay damages which ought to have been paid by the
wrongdoer, they may recover from him.4" Hence, a treating physi-
cian who aggravates or causes independent injuries through his own
negligence should be liable to the original tortfeasor who has been
compelled to pay the total amount of the plaintiff's damages.
Florida appellate courts have recognized by three distinct theories
the right of a tortfeasor to seek indemnification from another tort-
feasor.47 The Third District Court of Appeal has permitted indemni-
fication when it was predicated on the existence of an express con-
tract to indemnify.48 The Florida Supreme Court has allowed in-
42. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180.
43. THE FLORIDA BAR, CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, FLORIDA CIVIL PRACTICE BEFORE TRIAL
§ 26.2 (3d ed. 1975).
44. J. Ray Arnold Lumber Corp. v. Richardson, 141 So. 133.
45. Chappell v. Scarborough, 224 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
46. See generally Comment, Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 43 Miss. L.J. 670
(1972); Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 31 MoNT. L. REv. 69 (1969).
47. See Olin's Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Royal Continental Hotels, 187 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Fincher Motor Sales, Inc. v. Lakin, 156 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1963). See generally Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 302 So. 2d 187.
48. Mims Crane Serv., Inc. v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
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demnity when it was based on the violation of a duty between tort-
feasors.5 Under this concept of indemnity, both tortfeasors are at
fault and both are potentially liable to the person injured, even
though they are not in pari dilecto.55
In addition, the First District Court of Appeal has recognized a
principle of indemnity based on the degree of wrongful conduct
between multiple tortfeasors.51 This concept of indemnity comes
into play when the active negligence of one tortfeasor and the pas-
sive negligence of another combine and proximately cause an injury
to a third party. The passively negligent tortfeasor who is compelled
to pay damages is entitled to indemnity from the actively negligent
tortfeasor 2
At this point it is important to recognize the basic distinction
between contribution and indemnity. Contribution involves a distri-
bution of loss among joint tortfeasors by requiring each to pay a
proportionate share based on his degree of responsibility."3 In con-
trast, indemnity shifts the burden of liability from one tortfeasor
who has been compelled to pay damages to another tortfeasor whose
actions were completely independent. 4
The Holbrooks and Dr. Stuart were not joint tortfeasors. There
was no concert of action in their conduct. Neither had control over
the acts of the other. Thus, the recent holding of the Supreme Court
of Florida in Lincenberg v. Issen,55 which abolished the rule against
contribution between joint tortfeasors, has little applicability to this
case. Contribution was not an issue in Stuart.
However, the rationale used by the court to end the ban on contri-
bution in Lincenberg is consistent with allowing a third-party in-
demnity action in Stuart. In Lincenberg, the court emphasized the
unfairness and injustice of placing the entire burden on the party
who happens to be called on to pay the damages when payment
should be shared by another who was partly responsible for the
1969). In Mims, the court stated: "Although it has been said that the right to indemnity
springs from a contract, express or implied, the modern cases note that contract furnishes
too narrow a basis, and the principles of equity furnish a more satisfying basis for indemnity."
Id. at 839 (quoting 41 AM. JuR. (SECOND) Indemnity § 2 (1968)).
49. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 143 So. 316 (Fla. 1932).
50. For a clear statement of this rule, see Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Northwestern Tel. Exch.
Co., 167 N.W. 800 (Minn. 1918).
51. Winn-Dixie Stores v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45, 49 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
52. See also Chicago & Ill. M. Ry. v. Evans Constr. Co., 208 N.E.2d 573 (Ill. 1965).
53. See 18 AM. JUR. (SECOND) Contribution § 2 (1968).
54. See 41 id. Indemnity § 3.
55. 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975). See also Note, Contribution and Indemnity in California,
57 CALIF. L. REv. 490, 516 (1969).
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injury s.5 Fairness and justice would seem to dictate the same reason-
ing in Stuart.
The problem encountered by the Florida Supreme Court in Stuart
was that the third-party complaint filed by Hertz did not fit neatly
within any of the previously recognized tests: neither the express
contract test, the duty test, nor the active-passive test. It is clear
that there was no express or implied contract between Hertz and Dr.
Stuart. Nor can it be said that Dr. Stuart breached any duty owed
to Hertz. Furthermore, Hertz could not effectively assert that its
negligence, which gave rise to the original injury to Mrs. McCutch-
eon, was passive or secondary, while Dr. Stuart's negligence was
active or primary. Moreover, Hertz did not appear to be attempting
to shift its entire loss to Dr. Stuart (as is ordinarily the case in
indemnification), but instead was seeking indemnification for what-
ever damages it would be compelled to pay as a result of Dr. Stuart's
negligence."
Despite the aversion of the Florida Supreme Court to third-party
actions of this type, courts in other jurisdictions have recognized the
right of indemnification for the aggravation of injuries to the plain-
tiff by a subsequent tortfeasor when equity so dictates. Consistently
with the decisions in both Gertz and Herrero, the Court of Appeals
of New York has ruled recently that where a third party is found to
have been responsible for a part, but not all, of the damages for
which a defendant is held liable in negligence, the damages attrib-
utable for that part are recoverable by the primary defendant. 8
A number of other courts have also permitted third-party actions
by the original tortfeasor against a physician who aggravated the
plaintiff's injury on a theory of subrogation. 5 A third-party action
56. The court in Lincenberg also used the language of Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431
(Fla. 1973), in which the court adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence for Florida.
In Hoffman, the court said that contemporary conditions must be met with contemporary
standards which are realistic and better calculated to obtain justice among all the parties
involved. The court said: "Whatever may have been the historical justification for it, today
it is almost universally regarded as unjust and inequitable to vest an entire accidental loss
on one of the parties whose negligent conduct combined with the negligence of the other party
to produce the loss." Id. at 436.
57. 302 So. 2d at 192.
58. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972). In Dow, an employee of a milling
company died while cleaning his employer's grain storage bin which only recently had been
fumigated with a poisonous substance manufactured by a chemical company. The decedent's
estate sued the chemical company for negligence in failing to label the fumigant properly.
The chemical company then asserted its own right of recovery against the employer grain
company for breach of an independent duty to its employee. The court held that the chemical
company was entitled to maintain a third-party complaint against the employer for appor-
tionment of the total wrongful death damages.
59. Clark v. Halstead, 93 N.Y.S.2d 49 (App. Div. 1949). For further discussion of Clark,
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of this kind is premised on the theory that the original tortfeasor is
subrogated to any right of action which the injured person may have
had against the physician for malpractice."0
The holding in Stuart apparently represents an attempt by the
Florida Supreme Court to restrict the doctrine of indemnification to
those inflexible outlines which Florida courts have relied on in the
past. The evident judicial policy is based on artificial distinctions
and frustrates the achievement of just and equitable solutions in
matters involving multiple tortfeasors. The Stuart decision, with its
reliance on the archaic pronouncements in Transcon, is inconsistent
with the recognized goals in tort law of equitable loss-sharing by all
wrongdoers, effective loss distribution over a large segment of so-
ciety, and rapid compensation to an injured plaintiff."'
Moreover, the court's insistence that such third-party actions will
cloud the issues in the injured party's complaint totally ignores the
need for judicial economy in settling all matters arising out of the
same transaction in one combined proceeding. It ignores as well the
policy which favors promoting settlements out of court. In addition,
there is no equitable justification for recognizing a right of defen-
dants to seek contribution from each other on the basis of their
apportioned faults while denying that right to an initial tortfeasor
whose liability for damages is increased by the actions of a subse-
quent party acting on his own. 2 As Justice Dekle remarked in his
special concurrence in Ward v. Ocha,63 relating to Florida's compar-
ative negligence rule:
In the present posture of the matter, for "equal justice" on a
comparative basis, any involved party should be brought into the
matter in such position as he actually appears, and the limitation
on our own Florida third party practice which stands in the way
of this should be revamped accordingly . . . . The object is to
have a full and fair evaluation by the jury of the extent of each
party's actual liability. 4
Finally, the denial of a right of indemnification under the circum-
see 49 MICH. L. REv. 292 (1950). See generally Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 639 (1966). See also Greene
v. Waters, 49 N.W.2d 919 (Wis. 1951).
60. Fisher v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 180 N.W. 269 (Wis. 1920). In Fisher, the
court held that a railway company whose original negligence caused the fracture of an em-
ployee's wrist was entitled to subrogate part of its loss from a treating physician who had set
the fracture so negligently as to cause partial loss of the use of the arm.
61. See Contribution and Indemnity in California, supra note 55.
62. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d at 390.
63. 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973).
64. Id. at 388 (footnote omitted).
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stances in Stuart is simply not in keeping with modern societal
values." Nothing in the Stuart decision indicates that the various
defendants (neither Hertz nor the Holbrooks) played any part in the
selection of either Dr. Stuart or the hospital where he negligently
performed the operation. Also, there is no indication that the defen-
dants had even the slightest opportunity to protect themselves
against the doctor's negligence. Yet both defendants have been held
liable at law for the damages resulting from Dr. Stuart's negligence.
There is no logical reason why the ultimate burden of damages
should not be distributed equitably among the various defendants.
The determining factor in such cases should be fairness." And the
outcome in Stuart is simply not fair.
RICHARD GORDON
65. See also Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37
IOWA L. REv. 517 (1952).
66. See Leflar, supra note 34.
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